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I. INTRODUCTION
[Tihe individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his
right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. At one
time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of one
Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the
conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith
such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying principle has been
examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded
that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion
derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's
freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs
worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful,
and from recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling
intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects-or even
intolerance among "religions"-to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever
and the uncertain. 1
The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment requires the
government to uphold the principle of freedom of religion by not
discriminating among religions or between religion and non-religion. 2
Congress adopted this policy of non-discrimination on the basis of religion for
public accommodations when it passed Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 3 Now, the Boy Scouts of America ("Boy Scouts") contend that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of association makes the Boy Scouts
constitutionally immune from the Title II ban on discrimination against atheists,
agnostics, and other religious non-believers. This Note will argue, however,
that the First Amendment does not forbid the application of civil rights statutes
to the Boy Scouts, a group that many experts-including United States
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connora-believed was immune from
I Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985).
2 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) and
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b)(3) (1988).
4 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, I.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor noted in dicta in her concurrence, which no other justice
joined, that the training of survival skills and participation in community service could
become expressive when intended to develop morals or patriotism and cited the Boy Scout
Handbook as an example. The court in Welsh dismissed the Boy Scouts' reliance on
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such civil rights laws. In addition, this Note will show that public policy
supports application of Title II to the Boy Scouts.
In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,5 the Boy Scouts sought to exclude a
boy who did not believe in God from membership in their organization. Welsh
is the first case in which the Boy Scouts challenged application of federal civil
rights laws. Using the Welsh case as a factual framework, this Note will
discuss the fundamentals of freedom of association and analyze the
associational interests of the Boy Scouts to show that applying Title II and
similar state laws to the Boy Scouts does not violate the First Amendment.
Because Welsh was brought under Title I, that statute will be the main focus of
discussion, although the analysis applies equally to similar state statutes.
Finally, an analysis of the public policy reasons for applying civil rights
tatutes to the Boy Scouts will show that such religious discrimination must not
be tolerated.
A. Facts of Welsh
Mark Welsh was seven years old when he received a flyer soliciting
members for a local Tiger Cub Boy Scout troop. When Mark attended the
recruitment meeting for the Tiger Cubs with his father, Elliot Welsh, he
discovered that the Scouts required both Mark and his father to sign an
application form that "recognized a duty to God" and included an oath that the
signers would do their "duty to God." 6 Mark and his father did not adhere to
any organized religion and did not believe in God, so they decided that they
could not sign such an application. 7 They did not classify themselves as either
atheist or agnostic.8 The Boy Scouts refused to let Mark join the Tiger Cub
troop because of his and his father's refusals to acknowledge any belief in a
Supreme Being. 9 The plaintiffs sued under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,10 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion in a place of
public accommodation.
O'Connor's dictum that some scouting activities "might become expressive" as insufficient
for concluding that as a matter of law scouting activities are expressive. See Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1431 n.27 (N.D. 111. 1990).
5 742 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. ]11. 1990).
6 Id. at 1418. The Boy Scout oath reads: "On my honor I will do my best to do my
duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." WLLiAM
HILLCOURT, "IHE OFFICIAL BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK, 27 (1982).
7 Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1417.
8 Id. at 1417 n.3.
9 Id. at 1417-18.
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b)(3) (1988).
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The Boy Scouts filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which
the district court denied. 11 The Welshes then sought summary judgment, which
the court also denied.12 The case went to trial in June 1991, and in March
1992, the court decided that Title II did not apply to the Boy Scouts because
they were not a "place" as required by the statute. 13
B. Issues Presented by Welsh
This difficult case presents two overarching issues. The threshold question
is whether Title II even applies to the Boy Scouts. The Boy Scouts must be a
"public accommodation" for the civil rights statute to bar discrimination
because the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association prevents the
government from interfering in the membership decisions of a private group.
Federal courts have never dealt with this question before Welsh, and state
courts (applying state public accommodations laws, which may contain broader
or narrower definitions of applicable groups) have disagreed. 14
Second, if the Boy Scouts are found to be a public accommodation within
the meaning of Title 11, a constitutional issue arises. The question then becomes
whether the application of Title I to the Boy Scouts to force the Boy Scouts to
accept a non-believer as a member violates the Boy Scouts' freedom of
association, which is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
This Note will discuss why Title HI should apply to the Boy Scouts, 15 but
11 Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1416.
12 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 787 F. Supp. 1511, 1513 (N.D. M11. 1992).
13 Id. at 1538.
14 Compare Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976) with Curran v.
Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct. App. 1983).
15 See infra Part III.C. and accompanying text for policy reasons Title II should apply
to the Boy Scouts. Judge Rovner's opinion in Welsh held that Title II did not apply to the
Boy Scouts because the organization was not a place within the "place of public
accommodation" language of Title II. 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. I. 1992). The court found
that the Boy Scouts were "a membership organization" whose benefits flow primarily, if not
exclusively, from the interpersonal associations among its members rather than from a
tangible facility or "source of entertainment" which has moved in interstate commerce. Id.
at 1539-40. From this, the court concluded that the Boy Scouts did not fall into the "place
of entertainment" classification or any other classification that would constitute a "place of
public accommodation" as required by Title II. Id.
The court gave the word "place" its literal meaning of a physical place, rather than the
more expansive meaning other courts have advocated. See National Organization for
Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, 318 A.2d 33, 37-38 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1974) ("place," a term of convenience, not limitation, and should be read
expansively given the remedial objectives of civil rights statutes. The wording of the New
Jersey statute at issue was nearly identical to the wording of Title II.); see also United States
v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974) (public accommodation
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because the Welsh case is used merely as factual background to address a
constitutional issue, the Note will not focus on the intricacies of the statutory
analysis. Instead, this Note addresses the constitutional question of whether
application of civil rights laws to the Boy Scouts violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
I. BASICS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
"Freedom of association," as analyzed by the Supreme Court in the leading
cases of Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees16 and Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,17 includes two distinct interests:
intimate association and expressive association.
A. Associational Interests
"Intimate association" is generally thought of as a liberty guaranteed by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 It includes highly personal
relationships such as those between family members, and little state interference
is tolerated. 19
The Roberts majority named several factors to be considered in
determining whether an organization is an intimate association. Included were
the group's size, selectivity in membership, seclusion from others,
congeniality, purpose, and policy. 20
"Expressive association" is the right to come together as a group to
exercise First Amendment rights such as speaking or worshipping. In addition,
the Court has held that expressive association includes the right to associate
with others to pursue a wide variety of political, social, cultural, educational,
economic, and religious goals.21 Whether or not a group engages in expressive
activity is primarily a factual inquiry, and the right is not absolute. The
provisions cover establishments which provide a form of participatory entertainment) and
Miller v. Amusement Enters., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to
be liberally construed and broadly read).
Other courts have applied state civil rights statutes to force the Scouts to include
atheists. See Atheist Scouts Win Reinstatement, Pack Can't Exclude Twins for Not Saying
'God' Court Rules, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 9, 1992, at A4.
The Welsh opinion did not address the constitutional issues raised in this Note.
16 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
17 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
18 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, 77e Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624 (1980). Q Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) and Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).19 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
20 Id. at 620.
21 Id.. at 622.
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government may impinge on the right of expressive association if it uses the
least restrictive means to serve a compelling government interest. 22 In Roberts,
the Court designated the state's interest in eliminating gender discrimination as
compelling.23 This compelling government interest was expanded to a state
interest in eliminating "invidious discrimination" in New York State Club
Association v. City of New York.24
B. The Leading Cases: Roberts and Rotary
The Supreme Court's decisions in Roberts and Rotary are the leading cases
dealing with the freedom of association rights of organizations. Because the
Boy Scouts are a non-profit membership organization, as were the Jaycees and
the Rotarians, the analysis contained in these two cases is based on facts similar
to the situation presented in Welsh.
In Roberts, the Court held that Minnesota's application of its Human
Rights Act to compel the Jaycees to admit women as regular members did not
violate the members' freedom of intimate or expressive association. 25 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, said that the local Jaycees chapters did not
present an instance of constitutionally protected intimate association because
each chapter was a large and generally unselective group. He emphasized that
the chapter meetings often included non-members of both sexes. 26
The opinion went on to discuss the Jaycees' claim based on the group's
freedom of expressive association. Justice Brennan acknowledged that
government compulsion to accept unwanted members interfered with this right,
but said that such government-imposed burdens were permissible if they met
the familiar "strict scrutiny" test (a compelling government interest served by
the least restrictive means) employed in a wide variety of First Amendment
contexts. 27 "Infringements on that right [of association] may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
22 1d. at 623.
23 Id. at 624.
24 487 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (1988) (citing Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)). This case involved a consortium of clubs suing to have a
New York City anti-discrimination ordinance overturned. The clubs selected members on
many bases such as gender, race, religion, or ethnicity. Id. at 3, 8-10.
25 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.2 6 Id. at 610.
27 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Brown v. Socialist Workers,
459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982).
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restrictive of associational freedoms." 28 The unusual part of the Roberts
decision is that the state was able to meet its burden of proof.2 9
The Court characterized the state's interest in "eradicating discrimination
against its female citizens" as compelling.30 The opinion also described the
anti-discrimination statute as the "least restrictive means" for accomplishing the
state's ends because it imposed no serious burdens on the organization's
abilities to express its views. 31 The Court rejected the argument that the
admission of women as voting members would change the Jaycees
"philosophical cast" because such a view was based on "unsupported
generalizations" and "sexual stereotyping." 32
There were no dissents in Roberts, but Justice O'Connor took issue with
the majority's analysis in a concurring opinion. She stated that groups, such as
the Jaycees, who engage primarily in commercial activities receive only
minimal First Amendment protection, while groups that engage in expressive
activities receive stronger First Amendment protection that would exclude the
application of civil rights statutes. 33 As an example of a group engaging in
expressive association, she cited the Boy Scouts. 3 4
The Supreme Court fleshed out the standards for determining a
membership organization's associational rights in Rotary. There the Court held
that the application of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act to force Rotary
clubs to admit women did not violate club members' freedom of intimate or
expressive association. 35 While the primary purpose of the Jaycees is to
promote the business training and skills of its members, the main goals of
Rotary clubs are to promote humanitarian service, high vocational ethical
standards, and world peace.36 This value-oriented ethic is similar to the avowed
purposes of the Boy Scouts-to teach morals and good citizenship. 37
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, explained that the Rotary club did
not involve intimate association because of the potentially large size of local
28 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
29 See Douglas 0. Linder, Comment, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878 (1984). Strict scrutiny is often difficult for states to satisfy
because states have to prove that their interests are compelling instead of merely reasonable.
In essence, the state interests must outweigh the individual interests at stake in strict scrutiny
cases.3 0 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
31 Id. at 626.
32 Id. at 628.
33 Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34 Id. at 636.
35 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987).
36 Id. at 548.
37 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1417 (N.D. Mll. 1990).
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clubs, the high turnover rate among club members, and the regular
participation of "strangers" in club activities. 38 The Court emphasized that the
question of whether a group qualifies for associational protections is an
objective, factual inquiry.39
The application of the Unruh Act to Rotarians was also held to impose
little or no* burden on the expressive activities of the club and any slight burden
was justified by the state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination.
The Rotarians generally express positions on issues affecting businesses and
communities. Because opinions on these issues are unrelated to gender, the
Court held that the admission of women would not unduly burden the
Rotarians' expression because it would have no real effect on that expression. 40
I. THE ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE BOY ScouTs
A. The Boy Scouts as an Intimate Association
An analysis of the factors developed by the Supreme Court in Roberts and
Rotary shows that the Boy Scouts are not constitutionally protected as an
intimate association.
The Boy Scouts argued in the Welsh trial that the Boy Scouts were an
intimate association because Boy Scouts usually meet as "dens," groups
consisting of about six to eight boys.41 However, the Boy Scouts failed to
address the factors of selectivity and seclusion of the group which were crucial
to the Court's analyses in both of the leading cases. The Boy Scouts are a non-
selective organization, open to all boys of a certain age group and grade who
are willing to subscribe to the Boy Scouts' oath. 42 Because the Boy Scouts
require nothing of applicants beyond the proper age and willingness to sign the
oath, the Boy Scouts are even less selective than the Rotarians, who require
business or professional leadership for membership. 43 Because the Supreme
Court held that the Rotarians were not a selective organization, 44 it is unlikely
that the Court would find the Boy Scouts to be a selective club. Because
selectivity is one of the most important elements in the Court's intimate
3 8 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547-48.
3 9 Id. at 547 n.6.4 0 Id. at 548-49.
41 Defendant's Post-Trial Brief at 21.
42 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1425 (N.D. IM. 1990); see also
United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 485 (E.D. La. 1974)
(Youth football league that accepted all applications from whites was not selective.).
43 See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 540-41.
44 Id. at 546-47.
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association analysis, it is likely that a non-selective group such as the Boy
Scouts would fail as an intimate association.45
Beyond selectivity, the cases require courts to consider the group's
seclusion from others, size, purpose, and congeniality. 46 While the den is a
small group, it is not secluded from outsiders. Parents, who are non-members
of the Boy Scouts, are encouraged to attend the meetings. 47 The Boy Scouts, or
its sponsoring organizations, also conduct significant amounts of recruiting for
members in public schools and receive a great deal of funding from the public
through organizations such as United Way.48 Also, dens are not the only
groups in which Boy Scouts interact as Scouts. Monthly "pack" meetings
(often nearly 100 boys) and less frequent jamborees (sometimes involving
thousands of Scouts) involve many dens working together. The Boy Scouts as a
whole has more than 4 million members, 49  hardly a small, intimate
association.
In addition, the formation of the dens themselves is a random activity, not
one based on "personal affinity" or "congeniality." 50 While the members of a
den may become close friends, dens are not formed based on prior friendships.
They are formed based on proximity (either in a neighborhood, school, or
church) and random assignments. 51 The heart of the intimate relationships,
such as marriage and childbearing, that the Court has recognized as
constitutionally protected is that personal affinity has caused those protected
relationships to form.52 The relationships that the Court has protected were not
formed because of proximity or randomness, like the Boy Scouts, but because
of deeply personal feelings. Because the Boy Scouts meet none of the Supreme
45 Some commentators have argued that the Court's decision in Rotary "clos[ed] the
'intimate association' door" on most non-familial groups. See Robert N. Johnson, Note,
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Redefining
Associational Rights, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 141, 152.
46 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
4 7 Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 12.
48 Id. at 15-16.
49 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1430 (N.D. 111. 1990).
50 See supra note 47, at 20.
51 Id. This evidence was not contradicted by the defendant in Welsh and was
confirmed by a telephone conversation on February 4, 1992 with Mr. Matthew Ackerman,
field director of the Central Ohio Council of the Boy Scouts of America, headquartered in
Dublin, Ohio. Mr. Ackerman said that den formation was based on geography and
neighborhoods. Dens are now also divided by grade level. The sponsoring organization
(often a church or school) enters into an agreement with the Boy Scouts to provide the scout
program and adult leadership. The sponsoring organizations also recruit members, often
through fliers in public schools, as in Welsh.
52 See supra note 14.
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Court's analytical requirements for intimate association, the Boy Scouts' claim
to be an intimate association will fail.
B. Boy Scouts as an Expressive Association
To promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies the
ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in scout
craft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance and kindred virtues
using methods now in common use by the Boy Scouts. 53
This statement of purpose from the Boy Scout charter shows that Boy
Scouts engage in expressive activities, such as teaching patriotism and courage.
Glaringly absent, however, is any mention of "religion" or "duty to God" in
this purpose statement, which was approved by Congress when it chartered the
Boy Scouts. 54 This weighs against the Boy Scouts' strenuous arguments that
one of its primary purposes is to promote religious ideas for young boys.
If expressing and promoting the idea that a religious duty to God is
essential to the development of young boys is indeed central to the Boy Scouts'
mission, then an argument can be made that forcing the Boy Scouts to admit
non-believers would eliminate the group's ability to promulgate such a
message.55 Such an action would be similar to forcing the Catholic church to
accept atheists or Jews or Baptists into its ranks. However, both common sense
and legal analysis tell us that the Boy Scouts are a far cry from the Catholic
church. The common sense differences will shed light on the fundamental flaw
in the legal argument.
First, the Boy Scouts are not a religious club whose primary activities are
to conduct church services, bible studies, or the like. The group's primary
activities include camping, knot-tying, hiking, learning first aid, and perfecting
many other outdoor skills.56
Second, there is little actual religious activity required to occur in Scout
troops. The Boy Scouts do not define God, and tell Scout leaders that religious
activities are the business of the Scouts' parents and clergy.57 Scouts are
53 See supra note 47, at 13 (quoting the Boy Scout Charter).
54 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1916).
55 This argument is undercut by the fact that the 1.2 million-member Explorer branch
of scouting, which includes both young men and women from ages 14 to 20, does not
require its members to take an oath with a "duty to God" element. If religion was indeed
central to Scouting's mission, it is difficult to see why an entire branch is exempt from this
central tenet of the organization. See William A. Henry III, Tying tie Boy Scouts in Knots,
TIME, July 1, 1991, at 65.
5 6See HILLCOURT, supra note 6, at 60-210.
57 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1426 (N.D. MI1. 1990).
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encouraged to pursue religious ends outside of the Boy Scout program.58 The
Boy Scout Handbook defines the "duty to God" element of the oath this way:
"Your parents and religious leaders teach you to know and love God, and the
ways in which you can serve Him. By following these teachings in your daily
life, you do your duty to God as a Scout." 59 This duty to God requires no
activity as a Scout troop or as a Scout.
Also, the Boy Scouts do not require anyone to participate in any religious
activity. 60 The religious content of the activities in individual dens varies
widely and closed units, which are restricted to members of one religion, are
permissible.61 Throughout its briefs in Welsh, the Boy Scouts characterize the
proposed application of Title II as an action that would "make God optional" in
the Scouts, 62 but God is already optional under the Boy Scouts' own rules.
Perhaps most striking is the Boy Scouts' policy that adherents of any
religion, from Baptist to Zen, are tolerated within the organization. 63 Indeed,
the Boy Scout Handbook, in defining the section of the Boy Scout Law entitled
"A Scout is Reverent," says "It is our duty to respect others whose religion
may differ from ours, even though we do not agree with them."64 This
tolerance was a weighty indication to the Welsh court that the Boy Scouts were
not an expressive association that was formed to propagate religious views. "In
light of the Boy Scouts' apparent tolerance for an innumerable variety of
religious beliefs, it is difficult to understand how the organization could-even
if it so desired-present a unified expression on positions concerning
religion."65 Far from being a group that emphasizes and requires religion,
these factors would cause the Boy Scouts to appear to be a secular organization
in the eyes of most people.
This common sense view is incorporated into the legal flaws that destroy
the arguments of the Boy Scouts. From both a common sense view and a legal
perspective, a strong argument may be made that requiring the Boy Scouts to
admit atheists, agnostics, or non-believers in God would impose an extremely
minute or even non-existent burden on the group's expressive association.
Because the Boy Scouts currently do not require religious participation, it
would seem to be a simple matter to allow a member who does not believe in
God to sit out during any religious activities.
58 Id.
59 HILLCOURT, supra note 6, at 28.
60 Id.
61 Plaintiffs Reply Brief at 5.
62 Defendant's Post-Trial Brief at 15.
63 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1427 (N.D. 11. 1990).
64 HILLCOURT, supra note 6, at 41.
65 Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1431 n.26.
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The Boy Scouts argue, however, that the very presence of non-believers
within the group would undermine the unity of the group and its commitment
to religious values. 66 This argument smacks of the "women would change the
beliefs of the group" and "women would interfere with male members'
fellowship" arguments that the Court forcefully rejected in Roberts and
Rotary.67 It transfers into the religious arena the "stereotyping" and
"unsupported generalizations" that the Court called an inadequate basis for a
burden argument.68 In addition, witnesses testified at trial that atheist den
members had not caused any problems within their groups. 69
The Boy Scouts also argue that the admission of non-believers imposes a
severe burden on the group because churches that are Scouting sponsors would
disaffiliate from the Boy Scouts if these children were admitted.70 While some
Boy Scout dens are sponsored by church groups that may be inclined to
disaffiliate from the organization if it were required to admit non-believers, the
government action of applying Title 11 would by no means require such
disaffiliation. Because Scouting accepts adherents of every religion that
presupposes a Supreme Being, these church-sponsored troops undoubtedly
already contain members whose beliefs differ from those of the sponsoring
churches. In addition, all churches would not necessarily abandon the Boy
Scouts if the organization accepted agnostics or atheists as members. Some
churches may see such an action as an opportunity to evangelize, a Christian
tradition, and possibly change the beliefs of children who enter the Boy Scouts.
The Boy Scouts' argument is weak in yet another sense. Even if the Boy
Scouts' expressive activities were impinged upon, the government's compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination would be enough to justify such a burden.
The governmental interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of religion
or non-religion is nothing if not compelling. Discrimination against non-
believers is just as much discrimination on the basis of religion (by favoring
religion in general) as is the persecution of a minority religion by a majority
one.71 If anything, the governmental interest in preventing religious
discrimination may be more compelling than its interest in preventing gender
discrimination, which was held to be a compelling interest in Rotary and
66 Defendant's Post Trial Brief at 15.
67 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548-50
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627-28 (1984).6 8 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
69 Plaintiffs Post-Trial Brief at 23.
70 Defendant's Post-Trial Brief at 19. According to the defendants, approximately 51
percent of Scouts are sponsored by church groups. Id. at 11.
71 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985) (see supra note 1 and accompanying
text for the quote); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) and Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1952).
139519921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Roberts. The free exercise clause, the establishment clause, and many free
speech cases are based on the idea that every person should be free to believe
as he or she wishes, without interference by the state. The civil rights statutes'
inclusion of religion as an illegal basis for discrimination by "public
accommodations" indicates the government's belief that interference by these
organizations is not consistent with these guarantees.
In addition, civil rights statutes provide the least restrictive means of
serving the government's compelling interest in eliminating religious
discrimination. The statutes only apply to groups that are not primarily
religious in character, thereby avoiding interference in the affairs of churches,
bible groups, and other religious organizations. The statutes also only apply to
public accommodations, not to purely private organizations. Finally, they only
prohibit membership selection based on certain stereotypes and other criteria
that Congress has determined are unacceptable. Even groups covered by such
statutes are free to be as selective as they want in choosing their membership
based on what Congress has determined to be proper criteria. In short, no
intolerable burden is imposed and the government's compelling interest in
preventing the evils of discrimination is served well by applying Title I[ in this
case. Such an application therefore does not violate the First Amendment.
C. Public Policy Arguments for Applying Title II to the Boy Scouts
Sound public policy, as well as First Amendment law, militates in favor of
applying civil rights statutes to require the Boy Scouts to admit agnostics and
atheists.
First, the Boy Scouts are a high-profile public organization that is
congressionally chartered. 72 A congressional charter is basically a national
corporate charter and is quite similar to the charters issued by states to private
corporations. Congress's power to create such corporations comes from the
necessary and proper clause and is incident to its commerce powers. 73
Congress has chartered many organizations, such as the American Red Cross,
the Girl Scouts, the American Symphony Orchestra League, the U.S. Olympic
Committee, Little League, and the Daughters of the American Revolution.74
Most organizations incorporated by Congress, including the Boy Scouts, must
file an annual report of their proceedings with Congress.75
72 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-29 (West 1988). The Boy Scouts were originally chartered in
1916.
73 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
74 For a complete list of congressionally chartered organizations, see 36 U.S.C.A.
§ 1101 (West 1991).
75 36 U.S.C.A. § 28 (West 1991).
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Congressional charters by themselves do not turn the organization's actions
into the actions of the state.76 The charter simply creates a private corporation
under federal law, and few corporations are given this distinct honor.77 All
corporations are chartered by a government, usually a state, but their actions do
not thereby become those of the state, even if they are heavily regulated. 78 The
other major elements of state action-government control and supervision or a
symbiotic relationship-probably are not present here either. Beyond the
receipt of the annual report from the Boy Scouts, Congress exercises no
apparent supervision over the Boy Scouts. 79 Also, the Boy Scouts do not
perform any traditional government functions.8 0
If the state were responsible for the actions of the Boy Scouts, plaintiffs
could sue directly under the First and Fifth Amendments.81 They would likely
have a good case, because as the court in Welsh noted, the establishment clause
of the First Amendment probably would make it impossible for Congress to
charter an organization entitled to discriminate on the basis of religion.82
Even though a charter does not constitute government action and no other
elements of state action are present here, Congress's power to incorporate
entities is limited and rarely used. Because of the relative rarity of use, a
charter indicates congressional approval and support of an organization special
enough to receive such a charter. By allowing an organization with Congress's
imprimatur to discriminate on the basis of religion implies government
approval of such actions. This government sanction would undermine the
government's credibility in the civil rights area and is contrary to the First
Amendment policy of freedom to believe without government interference. 83
The Boy Scouts argue, however, that the chartering language stating that
the purposes of the organization are to be accomplished "using the methods
which were in common use by the Boy Scouts on June 15, 1916"84 indicates
76 San Francisco Arts and Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 543-
44 (1987). The Court held that the U.S. Olympic Committee was not a governmental actor
although it was congressionally chartered and dismissed a Fifth Amendment claim against
the U.S.O.C.
7 7 Id. at 542.
78 Id. at 543-44; see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
79 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 543-45, 545 n.27.
80 Id.
8 1 Id. at 542.
82 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1423-24 (N.D. ]11. 1990).
83 See Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of
Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053, 1064
(1990) (arguing that state encouragement, e.g., granting charters, of private action that
would be unconstitutional if undertaken by a state actor is unconstitutional state action).
84 36 U.S.C.A. § 23 (West 1988).
13971992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that Congress approved of its religious policies. 85 The Boy Scouts stated in
1911 that a duty to God was part of its creed. 86 However, there is no evidence
that Congress knew of the Boy Scouts' policies when it incorporated the Boy
Scouts. 87 Furthermore, the charter itself says that the Boy Scouts will "make
and adopt by-laws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the
United States of America, or any State thereof...... , This charter provision
could be read as requiring the Boy Scouts to comply with Title II, which is a
federal law. Alternatively, Title II could be seen as overruling any implied
congressional consent to exclusion of non-believers.
Second, the Boy Scouts have often attempted to exclude those who are
different-particularly girls and homosexuals. 89 The organization has gone to
court, at great expense, to prevent people belonging to these groups from
joining the organization. In the case of Timothy Curran, who was expelled
when the Boy Scouts discovered his homosexuality, the organization justified
its actions on the ground that because he was homosexual, Curran would not be
a good role model for young boys.90 Based on stereotypes and fears, the Boy
Scouts concluded that Curran would be a bad role model because of his status
as a homosexual-not because of any moral defect or illegal conduct. In fact,
Curran had attained the rank of Eagle Scout. This is precisely the kind of
stereotyping that civil rights laws were designed to prevent, and such prejudice-
based arguments pervade the Boy Scouts' position in this case.
Such discrimination is an affront to human dignity because it dehumanizes.
By refusing to deal with an individual because of the individual's status, a
group fails to recognize the person's individuality and humanity and thereby
diminishes us all. In addition, such attitudes cannot fail to be lost on
impressionable young boys. Societal disapproval of these exclusions is
beginning to be voiced, as Levi Strauss, Wells Fargo Bank, BankAmerica, and
a United Way chapter have cut off funding to the Boy Scouts because of their
refusal to admit homosexuals. 91 These discriminatory values are directly
contrary to the public policy expressed in the civil rights statutes, and
government support or approval of such discriminatory policies is not
85 Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1423.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 36 U.S.C.A. § 22 (West 1991).
89 See Mankes v. Boy Scouts of Am., 137 F.R.D. 409 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (girl's suit to
join the Boy Scouts dismissed on procedural grounds) and Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of
the Boy Scouts of Am., 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct. App. 1983) (homosexual man stated claim
under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act for illegal exclusion from the Boy Scouts).
90 Curran, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
91 See Boy Scouts Cut Off Over Ban on Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1992, at 49.
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constitutionally required and should not be tolerated if one ever hopes to see
the day when the United States has no need for anti-discrimination laws.
A third public policy reason for allowing Title II to be applied to the Boy
Scouts is that such an application does not impinge upon the Scouts' free
exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The Boy Scouts argue that
application of Title II would interfere with the Boy Scouts' free exercise rights
by "'prevent[ing] Scouts from joining together with others who, like
themselves, believe in God in order to lead reverent lives in which a duty to
God is acknowledged.'" 92 The court noted that the Boy Scouts do not engage
in religious worship activities. 93 The court also noted that under the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Department of Hwnan Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,94 individuals may not be excused from a valid law of general
application, such as Title II, on the basis of their religious beliefs. 95 If a
compelling state interest may be served without compromising a group's free
exercise of religion or other rights, public policy demands that appropriate
action be taken.
IV. CONCLUSION
Applying Title II to the Boy Scouts of America to prevent the organization
from excluding as members young boys who do not believe in God is
consistent with the First Amendment. Under the Supreme Court's precedents,
freedom of association may be burdened by the government if the burden is the
least restrictive means to serve a compelling government interest. The
admission of atheists presents a very slight burden to the Boy Scouts, and the
government interest in eliminating discrimination is compelling. Since the
statutes are the least burdensome means of preventing invidious discrimination,
the First Amendment test is satisfied.
In addition, the sound public policies of avoiding the appearance or reality
of government endorsement of discrimination and preventing the perpetuation
of discriminatory values militate in favor of applying the civil rights statutes to
prevent discrimination in this case.
The Boy Scouts of America, a congressionally chartered organization, is
more than a private club that can discriminate as it pleases. The Boy Scouts are
a public trust and a powerful symbol. This public status gives the group
money, clout, and drawing power. But it also imposes responsibilities. High
92 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1435 (N.D. fll. 1990).
93 Id.
94 494 U.S. 872, 876-82 (1990).
95 Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1436.
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among those responsibilities is to include all those who stand ready to: "Be
Prepared." 96
The Welsh court eloquently stated why a dispute that appears to be an
intrusive burden on the Boy Scouts for the benefit of a relatively small group of
agnostics and atheists is in reality a crucial battle in the war against
discrimination.
The emotional nature of the desire on the part of some to avoid association
with those who are different may merely illustrate better than any statute or
legal opinion ever can the extent to which certain types of discrimination have
become ingrained in our culture. Furthermore, it is in just these types of cases,
where the discrimination is so ingrained, that the effective utilization of civil
rights laws is most important. Cases involving allegations of racial and gender-
based discrimination, while now commonplace, rarely provoke the expressed
defense that such discrimination is justified. In contrast, religious
discrimination-including discrimination against those who do not believe in
God-remains openly defended by some in a way that most of our society no
longer tolerates with respect to other forms of discrimination. 97
If such discrimination is ever to be eliminated, it must be eradicated even from
our most sacred institutions. By allowing it to continue, particularly under the
aegis of government approval or acquiescence, is to allow intolerance to
flourish.
Lisa A. Hammond
96 "Be Prepared" is the Boy Scout motto. HILLCOURT, supra note 6, at 42.
97 Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1416 n.1.
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